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I. OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSIDERATION IN 
CHINA 
In modern society, providing sufficient remedies to people 
adversely affected by administrative decisions is fundamental to the 
rule of law and social justice.1It is generally accepted that there 
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 1 See H.W.R. WADE, TOWARD ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 3 (1963) (explaining social 
justice and the importance of the law and consequences). 
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should be a chain of remedies to settle disputes between citizens and 
their government.2  In China, as elsewhere, there are a range of 
informal (non-adjudicative) remedies and formal legal remedies. 
Informal remedies mainly comprise (1) recourse to People’s 
Congress deputies at all levels, (2) petitioning to “letters and visits” 
(xinfang) offices, and (3) direct appeal to agency decision-makers.  
Chinese citizens have two formal ways to challenge agency 
decisions: administrative litigation and administrative 
reconsideration. 
Administrative litigation, providing judicial review of 
agency action, was formally introduced in China by the passage of 
the Administrative Litigation Law (“ALL”) in 1989, which was 
revised in November 2014 and July 2017.3  Of course, this channel 
plays an important role in the resolution of disputes between 
Chinese citizens and their government (hereinafter “administrative 
disputes”), and in providing remedies to aggrieved citizens. But, 
taking into account the considerable costs, time and effort involved, 
administrative litigation may normally be considered a last resort. 
Therefore, administrative reconsideration has been made available 
as an alternative, less costly, and less time-intensive method of 
formal dispute resolution. 
In administrative reconsideration, the adjudicator is an 
administrative agency, not an external court.  However, to hold to 
the basic tenet of justice and fairness that “no one should be a judge 
                                                                                                           
 2 SeePETER LEYLAND & GORDON ANTHONY, TEXTBOOK ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 15 
(5th ed. 2005) (stating that the government needs to be able to be held accountable by the 
people as well as people being held accountable to the government). 
 3 Zhonghua Remin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (中华人民共和国行政诉讼法) 
[Administrative Litigation Law] (promulgated by the President of the People’s Republic of 
China, Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990, amended Nov. 1, 2014 and Jul.1, 2017) 1989 
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 2 (China) [hereinafter ALL]; see also He 
Haibo, How Much Progress Can a Legislation Bring?: The 2014 Amendment of the 
Administrative Litigation Law of PRC, 13U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(explaining Administrative Litigation Law and how it is drafted); Wang Jing, Revision of 
China’s Administrative Litigation Law and Prospects for Expanding Judicial Review to 
Normative Documents, U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (explaining prospects for 
expanding judicial review to normative documents). 
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in his own case,” the adjudicator should not be the original agency 
decision-maker.  Hence, under the Administrative Reconsideration 
Law (“ARL”),4 passed by the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress in 1999, a citizen who considers his or her rights 
impinged upon by an administrative decision may generally seek 
reconsideration from the relevant administrative agency at the next 
higherlevel (a “reviewing agency”).5 
It should be emphasized that, under Chinese law, 
administrative reconsideration is not usually a compulsory 
preceding step to initiating administrative litigation.  There is no 
                                                                                                           
 4 Zhonghua Remin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa (中华人民共和国行政复议法) 
[Administrative Reconsideration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) 1999STANDING COMM. NAT’L 
PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 3 (China) [hereinafter ARL]. Before passage of the ARL, 
administrative reconsideration had been governed by the Regulation on Administrative 
Regulation. Xingzheng Fuyi Tiaoli (行政复议条例) [Regulation on Administrative 
Reconsideration] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 24, 1990, effective Jan. 1, 1991, 
amended Oct. 9, 1994) 1994 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 24 (China). 
 5 It can be very complicated to determine the reviewing agency in China because of 
the complexity of administrative organization. The following considerations may assist in 
identifying the three main types of reviewing agency: 1) If the original agency decision-
maker is a government below the provincial government, the reviewing agency should be 
the government at next higher level.Specifically speaking, the decision made by the 
township-level government, reviewing agency should be the county-level government; 
decision by county-level government, reviewing agency municipal government; decision 
by municipal government, reviewing agency provincial government. 2) If the original 
agency decision-maker is a department of the government, the determination of reviewing 
agency should be based on the nature of the department. In many circumstances, there are 
two reviewing agencies: the government at the same level and the competent department at 
next higher level. The citizen can make a choice from two. For example, the decision made 
by the public security bureau of the county government, the reviewing agency can be the 
county government or the public security bureau of the municipal government.However, 
for the department that exercises vertical leadership over the customs, banking, national tax 
and foreign exchange administration or by a state security organ, the reviewing agency 
should only be competent department at next higher level. For example, the decision made 
by a national taxation bureau located in the county, the reviewing agency should be the 
national taxation bureau located in the municipality, not the county government. 3) In some 
circumstances, the original decision-maker is still the reviewing agency. If the decision 
made by a department under the State Council or by the provincial government, the citizen 
should apply to the decision-maker. For example, a citizen who is unsatisfied with the 
decision taken by the Ministry of Education, he or she should still apply to the Ministry of 
Education (not the State Council) for administrative reconsideration. See ARL, supra note 
4, art. 12–14 (stating that the needs of the people thatare taken into consideration in 
Administrative Reconsideration Law). 
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doctrine of exhaustion of remedies in China: an aggrieved party is 
not required to exhaust administrative reconsideration before 
seeking judicial review.6The ALLadopts the principle of individual 
freedom of choice in delineating the relationship between 
administrative reconsideration and administrative litigation.  Based 
on Article 44 of the ALL and other relevant statutes, there are only 
some circumstances where a person—be it a legal person or an 
organization—who is unsatisfied with an administrative decision 
must apply for administrative reconsideration first,before continuing 
to challenge the relevant administrative decision through 
administrative litigation. 7 It is only in even more limited 
circumstances—as provided for by specific laws of the National 
People’s Congress or its Standing Committee—that reconsideration 
decisions are deemed to be final.8 
Compared with administrative litigation, administrative 
reconsideration has some structural advantages for resolving 
disputes. First, administrative reconsideration permits review of a 
broader range of administrative decisions.  Not all administrative 
                                                                                                           
 6 In recent years, however, some scholars have advocated carrying out “compulsory 
reconsideration first” in order to make administrative reconsideration become the main 
forum for resolution of administrative disputes. See, e.g., Zhou Lanling (周兰领 ), 
Xingzheng Fuyi Qiangzhi Qianzhi Moshi de Chongjian(行政复议强制前置模式的重建) 
[Reconstruction of Model of Compulsory Choice of Administrative Reconsideration], 4 
CHANG’AN DAXUE XUEBAO (SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) 63 (2008) (China) (hypothesizing using 
compulsory reconsideration to facilitate the efficiency of determining the outcome of 
administrative disputes and proposing it as an improved model). Other scholars object to 
this idea. See, e.g., Yang Weidong (杨伟东), Fuyi Qianzhi Yihuo Ziyou Xuanze—Woguo 
Xingzheng Fuyiyu Xingzheng Susong de Guanxi Chuli (复议前置抑或自由选择—我国行
政复议与行政诉讼关系的处理)[Reconsideration First or Free Choice—Treatment of the 
Relationship between Administrative Reconsideration and Administrative Litigation in 
China], 2 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU 71 (2012) (advocating against using compulsory 
reconsideration). 
 7 Per relevant provisions of laws or regulations. Such laws and regulations cover 
administrative decisions relating to taxation, collection of customs duties, payment of 
social insurance premiums, trademark registration, examination of patent, etc. It is hard to 
summarize the underlying standards that apply here, requiring administrative 
reconsideration to be sought first. 
 8 See, e.g., ARL, supra note 4, art. 30 (detailing the specifics of the law). 
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disputes are justiciable under the Administrative Litigation Law.9  
Thus, reviewability of administrative decisions has been a very 
important (and hotly discussed) academic and practical issue in 
China. But it is generally accepted that the scope of review in 
administrative reconsideration is wider than in administrative 
litigation. 
Second, administrative reconsideration permits deeper 
intensity of review of administrative decisions. In administrative 
litigation, courts can only review the “legality” of administrative 
decisions, generally speaking;10 in administrative reconsideration, 
the reviewing agency has the power to review both the legality and 
the reasonableness of the administrative decision.11  In other words, 
the authority of reviewing agencies extends to “merit review.” 
Furthermore, reviewing agencies can substitute their own decision 
for the decision made by the original agency decision-maker; formal 
remand is unnecessary.12 
Third, administrative reconsideration features relatively 
lower costs and quicker results.  Unlike courts in administrative 
litigation, the reviewing agency cannot charge fees from applicants 
for administrative reconsideration. 13   Although professional 
representation is not required either in administrative litigation or 
administrative reconsideration, it is more feasible for aggrieved 
                                                                                                           
 9 Currently, some administrative decisions are precluded from administrative 
litigation, such as state acts in areas like national defense and foreign affairs, and personnel 
decision involving civil servants. ALL, supra note 3, art. 13. 
 10 See ALL, supra note 3, art. 6, 70, 77 (examples of references to the legality of 
administrative decisions). 
 11 See ARL, supra note 4, art. 1, 28 (examples where both legality and reasonableness 
are taken into consideration). 
 12 According to article 28 of the ARL, the reviewing agency has power to nullify, 
change or deem illegal a specific administrative act if it is taken in one of the following 
circumstances: 1) the main facts are not clear, and essential evidence is inadequate; 2) the 
basis is used incorrectly; 3) statutory procedures are violated; 4) authority is exceeded or 
power is abused; or 5) the act is obviously inappropriate. ARL, supra note 4, art. 28. 
 13 See ARL, supra note 4, art. 39 (stating that when accepting an application for 
administrative reconsideration, the administrative reviewing agencies may not charge the 
applicant any fee). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
112 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 13] 
citizens to represent themselves in the administrative 
reconsideration process.  Administrative reconsideration procedures 
are relatively simple and streamlined. The basic idea behind these 
arrangements is to encourage citizens to make use of administrative 
reconsideration.14 
Despite these advantages, administrative reconsideration has 
not met expectations in terms of public trust and support.  Indeed, 
its poor performance is often cited in critical analysis of the many 
complaints and disputes in China in recent years. 15   As an 
alternative and less onerous dispute resolution procedure, 
administrative reconsideration should handle many more 
administrative disputes than are processed through litigation.  
However, that has not proven the case, as the following table 
indicates: 
 
 
 
Table I: Administrative Reconsideration &Administrative Litigation 
Cases, 2000–200716 
                                                                                                           
 14See Ying Songnian (应松年), Ba Xingzheng Fuyi ZhiduJianshe Chengwei Woguo Jiejue 
Xingzheng Zhengyi de Zhuqudao(把行政复议制度建设成为我国解决行政争议的主渠
道) [Build Administrative Reconsideration into the Main Channel to Settle Administrative 
Disputes], 5 FAXUE LUNTAN1, 8 (2011) (stating that administrative disputes should 
consider administrative reconsideration as a natural part of the process to resolution). 
 15 See Hu Kui & Jiang Shu, Xinfang Hongfeng(信访洪峰)[The Flood of Xinfang], 4 
LIAOWANG DONGFANG ZHOUKAN 1, 32–35 (2003) (describing the grim situation regarding 
a large number of disputes and xinfang cases China was faced with in 2003). The number 
of administrative reconsideration cases is much less than the number of xinfang cases. See 
Ying Songnian (应松年), Xingzheng Fuyi Yingdang Chengwei Jiejue Xingzheng Zhengyi 
de Zhuqudao( 行 政 复 议 应 当成 为 解 决 行 政 争 议的 主渠 道 ) [Administrative 
Reconsideration Should Become the Main Forum of Resolution of the Administrative 
Disputes], 12 XINGZHENG GUANLI GAIGE 1, 49 (2010) (arguing that administrative 
reconsideration should have a much more important role in settling administrative 
disputes). 
 16 ZHONGGUO FALÜ NIANJIAN(中国法律年鉴) [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA] 1256 
(2001)[hereinafter LAW Y.B. CHINA]; LAW Y.B. CHINA 1238 (2002); LAW Y.B. CHINA 
1319 (2003); LAW Y.B. CHINA 1054, 1071 (2004); LAW Y.B. CHINA 1064, 1079 (2005); 
LAW Y.B. CHINA 988, 1007–08 (2006); LAW Y.B. CHINA 1065, 1085 (2007); LAW Y.B. 
CHINA 1016, 1134–35 (2008); Liu Xin (刘莘), Xingzheng Fuyi de Dingwei Zhizheng(行政
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Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Administrative 
Reconsideration 
Cases 
74,448 80,857 74,168 75,918 81,833 90,624 91,667 85,587 
Administrative 
Litigation Cases17 
85,760 100,921 80,728 87,919 92,613 96,178 95,617 101,510 
 
The table shows the caseload for administrative 
reconsideration generally has been less than that for administrative 
litigation,18  and certainly much lower than might be expected.  
These numbers illustrate that administrative reconsideration has not 
served as the primary means for resolving administrative disputes 
and redressing citizen grievances in China. Again, Chinese law 
generally does not require exhaustion of remedies before citizens 
may file for administrative litigation. But citizens who do file for 
administrative reconsideration first—whether at their own discretion 
or following certain statutory requirements—almost always retain 
the right to appeal the result of the reconsideration proceeding 
through administrative litigation.19  Even so, this benefit has not 
proven sufficient to incentivize administrative reconsideration as a 
preferred way to challenge administrative decisions.  Indeed, in 
2006 it was reported that as many as 70% of administrative 
                                                                                                           
复议的定位之争) [The Discussion of the Position of Administrative Reconsideration], 5 
FAXUELUNTAN1, 11–15 (2011). 
 17 These figures for administrative litigation only include first-instance cases, and not 
second-instance cases. 
 18 From 2008 to 2012, and particularly during 2010–2012, the number of 
administrative reconsideration cases tended to increase (to more than 100,000 cases per 
year), but still remained less than the number of administrative litigation cases (which rose 
to more than 120,000 cases per year). For more details, please see infra Part III Table 2 
(explaining the numbers with more specificity). 
 19 See ALL, supra note 3, art. 44 (stating that filing for administrative reconsideration 
does not bar the ability to appeal the result through administrative litigation). 
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litigation cases involved no prior claim for administrative 
reconsideration.20 
In considering that statistic, it should be noted that, from 
2003 to 2006, China experienced a flood of disputes and grievances, 
including complaints against administrative agencies. 21   It is 
unfortunate that administrative reconsideration did not play a more 
active role in the resolution of such complaints.  Apparently, most 
claimants preferred to use informal, non-law based remedial 
channels, especially “letters and visits” (xinfang).22 
What all this clearly shows is that the above-mentioned 
advantages of administrative reconsideration were mostly illusory 
for most citizens.  They did not believe that administrative 
reconsideration could bring them justice.  Hence, the mechanism of 
administrative reconsideration was in a state of crisis, marked by 
public distrust. 
II. A NEW EXPERIMENT: ADMINISTRATIVE 
RECONSIDERATION COMMITTEES 
Confronted with this situation, some agencies tried to make 
changes to improve the fairness of administrative reconsideration 
and win the public’s trust.  For example, some local governments 
held public hearings in administrative reconsideration cases. 23  
                                                                                                           
 20 Li Li(李立), Qi Cheng Xingzheng Susong Anjian Suqian Wei Jingguo Xingzheng 
Fuyi (七成行政诉讼案诉前未经行政复议) [Seventy Percent of Administrative Litigation 
Cases are without Administrative Reconsideration], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Dec. 4, 
2006, http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/content/2006-12/04/content_475926.htm 
[perma.cc/JM9P-FZGW]. 
 21 See, e.g., Lianjiang Li et al., Petitioning Beijing: The High Tide of 2003–2006, 210 
CHINA Q. 313, 313–14 (2012) (describinga “high tide” of petitioning the government from 
2003 to 2006). 
 22 Id. 
 23 See, e.g., Li Li, Yinling Shehui Tongxiang Gongping Zhengyi Hexie: Xingzheng 
Fuyi Gongzuo Zuotanhui Fayan Zongshu (引领社会通向公平正义和谐: 行政复议工作
座谈会发言综述) [Leading Society Toward Fairness, Justice and Harmony—Summary of 
Speeches at the Administrative Reconsideration Forum], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Dec. 
5, 2006, http://www.china.com.cn/policy/zhuanti/hxsh/txt/2006-
12/05/content_7459010.htm [perma.cc/AG94-R2W8] (describing an Administrative 
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These efforts pushed forward the development of administrative 
reconsideration, but they were sporadic, and did not remove the key 
factors limiting the fairness of the procedure or otherwise provoke 
any basic changes. 
Some essential criteria for successful complaint systems 
include independence, accessibility, clarity of jurisdiction, fairness, 
and effectiveness.  Although different theorists may prioritize these 
criteria differently, independence is always high on the list.24  The 
greatest defect of the present administrative reconsideration system 
in China is precisely that—lack of independence.25  Superficially, 
the reviewing agency, as a higher-level agency, is independent of 
the original agency decision-maker, but of course the two levels 
work closely with one another, fueling the popular perception that 
“officials shield one another.”  More problematic is the lack of clear 
separation between the adjudicative and administrative functions 
within the reviewing agency.  As a consequence, reviewing agencies 
                                                                                                           
Reconsideration Forum and providing summaries of speeches exhibited there); Li Li, 
Jiangsu Quanmian Tuixing Xingzheng Fuyi Zhizheng Tingzheng Zhidu (江苏全面推行行
政复议质证听证制度) [Jiangsu Fully Carried Out the Cross-examination and Hearing in 
the Administrative Reconsideration Cases], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Jan. 8, 2007, 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/misc/2007-01/08/content_509148.htm [perma.cc/N9CG-
KXC9] (providing examples of hearings in Administrative Reconsideration cases). 
 24 See CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 422 (1997) 
(stating different criteria, with independence as a major factor). 
 25 See, e.g., Zhou Hanhua ( 周 汉 华 ), XingzhengFuyiZhiduSifahua Gaige 
JiqiZuoyong( 行政复议制度司法化改革及其作用 )[Judicial Oriented Reform of 
Administrative Reconsideration and its Implications], 2 
GUOJIAXINGZHENGXUEYUANXUEBAO1, 33–34 (2005) (pointing out that the present 
administrative reconsideration system is designed as an administrative supervision system 
and is therefore not separated from ordinary administrative activities); Wang Wanhua (王
万华), Xingzheng Fuyi Fa Xiugai de Jige Zhongda Wenti(行政复议法修改的几个重大问
题) [Several Major Issues in Amendment to Administrative Reconsideration Law], 4 
XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU 80, 82 (2011) (arguing that the organization handling 
administrative reconsideration cases is the ordinary administrative organization, which is 
still subject to the administrative agency in many aspects, such as outlay, appointment of 
staff, and assessment of work); Fang Jun (方军), Woguo Xingzheng Fuyi Zuzhi Gaige 
Chuyi ( 我国行政复议组织改革刍议 ) [On the Reformation of Administrative 
Reconsideration Organization in China], 5 FAXUE LUNTAN16, 17 (2011) (arguing that the 
organization handling the administrative reconsideration cases used ordinary 
administrative procedure to solve disputes). 
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tend to employ “administrative” ways of thinking about and 
handling administrative disputes. 
In September 2008, following the strong recommendation of 
Chinese administrative law scholars, and in light of the experience 
and practices of other countries,26 the Legislative Affairs Office of 
the State Council (“State Council LAO”) promulgated the “Notice 
on Trial Experimentation of Administrative Reconsideration 
Committees in Some Provinces and Municipalities Directly Under 
the Central Government” (“Notice”),27 introducing an experimental 
reform designed to improve the independence of administrative 
reconsideration.  So-called “experimental reform” is a common way 
to carry out trial reform in China, and is frequently used in the 
social policy area.  Under this approach, some representative cities 
or areas are selected to test out the contemplated reform.  After a 
period of time, the outcome of the trial reform is evaluated, a 
process that determines whether it will be adopted nationwide.  This 
approach to reform can help policy-makers avoid the potential 
instability that might be caused by an immature plan of reform, and 
                                                                                                           
 26 In recent years, Chinese administrative law scholars have introduced and analyzed 
foreign systems of administrative review, such as the U.S. administrative law judicial 
system, U.K. administrative tribunals, South Korean administrative reconsideration, and 
even the administrative appeal system of Taiwan.See, e.g., LÜ Yanbin (吕艳滨), Riben he 
Hanguo de Xingzheng FuyiZhidu —Xingzheng Fuyi Sifahua Ruogan Shili (日本、韩国的
行政复议制度—行政复议司法化的若干实例) [Administrative Reconsideration System 
in Japan and South Korea—Some Examples of Judicializing Administrative 
Reconsideration], 1 HUANQIU FALÜ PINGLUN 7, 7–16 (2004) (analyzing the Japanese and 
South Korean administrative reconsideration systems); Zheng Lei (郑磊) & Shen Kaiju (沈
开举), YingguoXingzhengCaipansuo de Zuixin Gaige Jiqi Qishi (英国行政裁判所的最新
改革及其启示 ) [The Latest Reform and Enlightenment of British Administrative 
Tribunals], 3 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU 127, 127–31 (2009) (presenting introductory 
background and key points of British government reforms to the UK administrative 
tribunal system in 2007). 
 27 Guowuyuan Fazhi Bangongshi (国务院法制办公室), Guanyu Zai Bufen Sheng 
Zhixiashi Kaizhan Xingzheng Fuyi Weiyuanhui Shidian Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于在部
分省、直辖市开展行政复议委员会试点工作的通知) [Notice on Trial Experimentation 
of Administrative Reconsideration Committees in Some Provinces and Municipalities 
directly under the Central Government] (Sept. 16, 2008), 
http://fgs.ndrc.gov.cn/xzfy/200904/t20090417_273029.html [perma.cc/2AWV-
DSPT][hereinafter Notice]. 
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also to uncover relevant problems and accumulate experience more 
generally.  Thus, in issuing the Notice, the State Council LAO 
hoped to bring about a moderate and gradual reform. 
The Notice’s main innovation is to establish administrative 
reconsideration committees (“ARCs”), organs composed of two 
kinds of members: full-time members drawn from the government 
bureaucracy, and part-time members who are legal and other experts 
drawn from institutions outside the administration.  ARCs are 
chaired, in principle, by the leading official (or their deputy) of the 
same level of government; the vice-chair is the head of the same-
level legislative affairs office (fazhiban).  These committees are 
granted the power to discuss and decide administrative 
reconsideration cases. At the same time, the Notice diminishes the 
number of alternate reconsideration organsion the pilot areas within 
particular government departments. 28  This effort to establish a 
relatively unified model of administrative reconsideration may be 
contrasted with the approach of the ARL, under which any 
administrative agency except those at the lowest level may serve as 
a reviewing agency. 29   Indeed, according to a recent NPC 
investigation, there exist a total of 30,450 reviewing agencies at 
local levels alone.30 
                                                                                                           
 28 The Notice states: “[o]n the basis of administrative reconsideration decisions made 
lawfully in the name of administrative reconsideration agencies, resources concerning 
administrative reconsideration should be reasonably integrated, and methods of accepting 
and dealing with cases by pooling reconsideration resources should be actively 
investigated.”Id. at art. 1(3). 
 29 As mentioned earlier, the reviewing agency, in principle, should be the 
administrative agency at the next higher level; the original agency serving as the reviewing 
agency is limited to high-level agencies, such as ministries of the State Council, and 
provincial-level governments. 
 30 See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Zhifa Jianchazu 
Guanyu Jiancha Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa ShishiQingkuang de 
Baogao (全国人民代表大会常务委员会执法检查组关于检查《中华人民共和国行政复
议法》实施情况的报告) [Report on the Enforcement of Administrative Reconsideration 
Law of the People’s Republic of China by the Law Enforcement Inspection Group of the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress], Zhongguo Renda Wang(Dec. 24, 
2013), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2013-12/24/content_1819964.htm 
[perma.cc/P758-DCMY] [hereinafter Enforcement of Administrative Reconsideration Law] 
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On its own terms, what is most distinctive about the ARC 
model is that it invites scholars and experts from outside the 
administration, as part-time members of the committee, to take part 
in the discussion and even the resolution of administrative 
reconsideration cases.  Thus, it brings an outside element and power 
into the adjudicative process, using this externality both to improve 
the quality and demonstrate the independence of administrative 
reconsideration.  Of course, this independence is not complete—
ARCs are still established within the relevant government authority, 
and make a decision that ultimately has to be issued under the name 
of that authority. Therefore, the independence of ARCs is moderate, 
rooted in separating the adjudicative function from the 
administrative function within the government. 
The Notice identified eight provinces and municipalities that 
would carry out this experimental reform of administrative 
reconsideration. 31   In turn, these provinces and municipalities 
selected a total of thirty-five pilot areas to undertake the task. Over 
time, these numbers gradually increased so that by the end of 2011 
there were a total of 108 pilot areas, distributed over 19provinces 
and municipalities, implementing the Notice’s provisions.32  These 
provinces and municipalities were authorized by the Notice to draw 
up their own specific plans for ARCs based on local needs and 
circumstances.  In practice thus far, two versions of ARCs appear to 
                                                                                                           
(detailing the NPC investigation and stating the expansiveness of number of reviewing 
agencies). 
 31 These provinces and municipalities are Beijing, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, 
Henan, Guangdong, Hainan, and Guizhou. The Notice also suggests that other regions may 
also conduct trial experimentation along these lines. See Notice, supra note 27, art. 2 
(stating the possibility of conducting the trial experimentation). 
 32 See Zhang Yang & Cai Changchun, Shijiu ge Shengfen Yilingba ge Danwei You le 
Xingzheng Fuyi Weiyuanhui (19 个省份 108 个单位有了行政复议委员会) [108 Pilot 
Areas in 19 Provinces and Municipalities Established Administrative Reconsideration 
Committees], RENMIN RIBAO (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.law-
lib.com/fzdt/newshtml/fzjd/20120328163942.htm [perma.cc/UDX8-XMZH] (explaining 
the number and distribution of the pilot areas). 
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have been implemented: (1) the “unified” (jizhong) ARC model, 
and (2) the “panel discussion” (heyi) ARC model. 
Under the “unified” ARC model, all or most administrative 
reconsideration cases at a particular level of government are 
accepted, heard, and even finally decided by the ARC established at 
that level.33In other words, different government departments (or 
branches) lose their separate authority to handle administrative 
reconsideration cases.  In some of the pilot areas where this model 
has been implemented, the ARCs enjoy “final say” in their cases.  
For example, in Harbin, the capital city of Heilongjiang Province, if 
the head of the municipal government refuses to endorse the ARC’s 
decision, the ARC can in effect overrule that refusal by re-affirming 
its decision with a two-thirds majority.  After re-affirming the 
decision, the head of the municipal government can block the 
ARC’s decision only by convening an executive committee meeting 
(but this procedure has never been activated to date).34 
Compared with the “unified” ARC model, under the “panel 
discussion” ARC model, even more emphasis is placed on the 
inclusion of outside legal experts (from universities, research 
institutes, law firms, etc.) in the deliberations of the ARC, as part-
time members.  For example, the ARC of the Beijing municipal 
government significantly involves its outside legal experts in 
                                                                                                           
 33 Local governments that follow this model include those of Harbin, Jinan, Jining 
and Linyi. See Gao Fengtao, Chuangxin Xingzheng Fuyi Tizhi Jizhi Tuidong Xingzheng 
Fuyi Weiyuanhui Shidian Gongzuo Shenru Kaizhan —Zai Xingzheng Fuyi Weiyuanhui 
Shidian Gongzuo Xianchanghui Shang de Jianghua, (创新行政复议体制机制推动行政复
议委员会试点工作深入开展—在行政复议委员会试点工作现场会上的讲话) [Official 
Speech on Administrative Reconsideration at On-site Meeting Concerning the Pilot Work 
of the Administrative Reconsideration Committee in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province] (Aug. 
5, 2010), 
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xzfy/wjjjh/ldjh/201008/20100800260075.shtml 
[perma.cc/5XAE-T4CF] (providing an example of an administrative reconsideration case 
that has been accepted, heard, and decided by the ARC at the same level). 
 34 See Legislative Affairs Office of Harbin, The Achievements of the Work of the 
Administrative Reconsideration Committee in Harbin are Obvious, 
http://www.hrblaw.gov.cn/fb/5/101/2010/04/i13045.shtml (stating that the executive 
committee meeting has not been convened to block ARC’s decision in the past, and 
signifying this as a success). 
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hearing administrative reconsideration cases.  In ARC meetings, 
these outside legal experts can not only give suggestions, but even 
cast votes on the cases. In some circumstances, they can also 
preside in public hearings of the ARC. However, in this model, the 
ARC serves mainly as a consultative body that provides suggestions 
to the reviewing agency, which retains final decision-making 
authority. 
III. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ARC MODEL 
Even as implementation of the ARC model expands and 
further develops with the general support of Chinese administrative 
law scholars and the media, until now there has not been an overall 
and systematic evaluation—official or unofficial—of this new 
approach to administrative reconsideration in China.  In offering a 
preliminary assessment here, I argue that there are many potential 
benefits to the ARC model. 
First, the ARC model can resist a certain degree of 
administrative pressure.  Part-time committee members, in 
particular, will be more immune to administrative factors and 
influences, and can render a relatively independent judgment.  Full-
time committee members, then, can protect themselves behind the 
part-time members when reconsideration decisions go against 
agency decision-makers. 
Second, the ARC model can improve the quality of 
reconsideration decisions. Part-time committee members usually are 
law professors, trial lawyers, or experts in other fields, who can 
offer suggestions or opinions that are different from the views of 
full-time committee members.  This open and wide-ranging 
discussion lends itself to greater rationality in the decision-making 
process in reconsideration cases. 
Third, the ARC model may change public perceptions of 
administrative reconsideration in China by opening up the decision-
making process and bringing in fresh air and new energy. This may 
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give the general public reason to believe that administrative 
reconsideration will no longer be completely controlled by the 
administration itself. 
As the originator of this reform, the State Council LAO has 
tried to keep track of its progress, and has noted some 
achievements.35In recent years, some related changes have been 
apparent, and it can be said that both the quantity of administrative 
reconsideration cases and the quality of the administrative 
reconsideration decision-making process have increased.  For 
example, in 2011, there was a marked increase in the number of 
administrative reconsideration cases handled by provincial-level 
governments.36In twelve provinces, there was an increase of more 
than 10%; in another four provinces, the increase was by more than 
40%. 37   In some pilot areas, the number of administrative 
reconsideration cases has come to exceed the number of 
administrative litigation cases. For example, in Weifang City, 
Shandong Province, the ratio of administrative reconsideration cases 
                                                                                                           
 35 See, e.g., Gan Zangchun, Deputy Dir., State Council LAO, (以党的十八大精神为
指导努力推动行政复议工作创新发展——在 2012 年全国行政复议年度工作会议上的
讲话) [Official Speech on Administrative Reconsideration at the Annual National Work 
Conference on Administrative Reconsideration] (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.chinalaw.
gov.cn/article/xzfy/wjjjh/ldjh/201303/20130300384783.shtml [perma.cc/P7DK-YA93] 
(updating on the progress of Administrative Reconsideration); Gao Fengtao, Deputy 
Director, State Council LAO, (认真贯彻胡锦涛总书记重要讲话精神把行政复议打造成
为化解行政争议的主渠道——在 2011 年行政复议年度工作会议上的讲话) [Official 
Speech on Administrative Reconsideration at the Annual National Work Conference on 
Administrative Reconsideration] (Dec. 15, 2011), 
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xzfy/wjjjh/ldjh/201201/20120100359445.shtml 
[perma.cc/7UC6-RZB6] (summarizing the progress of Administrative Reconsideration and 
proposing further reforms); Gao Fengtao, Deputy Director, (围绕主题主线扎实推进行政
复议工作创新发展——在 2010 年度行政复议工作会议上的讲话) [Official Speech on 
Administrative Reconsideration at the Annual National Work Conference on 
Administrative Reconsideration] (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xzfy/
wjjjh/ldjh/201101/20110100331743.shtml [perma.cc/75TA-7ZRK] (proposing reforms 
with Administrative Reconsideration). 
 36 Li Li, Duodi Xingzheng Fuxi An Dafu Pansheng, Xinfang Liang Xiajiang(多地行
政复议案大幅攀升信访量下降 ) [Administrative Reconsideration Cases Increased 
Dramatically and the Number of Xinfang Dropped in Many Places], FAZHI RIBAO (Nov. 25, 
2011),http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2011_11/25/10895295_0.shtml[perma.cc/CY
L3-P8QA]. 
 37 Id. 
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to administrative litigation cases had been 1:2 before the State 
Council LAO’s introduction of the ARC model, but as of 2011, the 
ratio was 1.12:1.38 
On September 2, 2013, the NPC Standing Committee 
launched an inspection, under the direction of Standing Committee 
Chairman Zhang Dejiang, on the implementation of the 
Administrative Reconsideration Law. 39   Six sub-groups were 
dispatched across China to conduct the investigation, and eight 
provincial-level standing committees were delegated to perform the 
same task within their own jurisdictions. 40 The report by the 
inspection group, issued on December 23, 2013, noted the recent 
increase in the number of administrative reconsideration cases, and 
its greater correlation to the number of administrative litigation 
cases. Indeed, in some provinces and with respect to some 
departments, the number of administrative reconsideration cases has 
even come to exceed that of first instance administrative litigation.  
For example, the number of administrative reconsideration cases is 
close to or even more than two times the number of first instance 
administrative litigation cases in Heilongjiang Province, Shanghai 
Municipality, and elsewhere.41 
The following table shows the numbers of administrative 
reconsideration cases and first instance administrative litigation 
cases, respectively, from 2008 to 2012, in the aftermath of the State 
Council LAO’s September 2008 Notice. 
 
                                                                                                           
 38 Id. 
 39 For a discussion of “law enforcement inspection”, seegenerallyYan Lin, The NPC 
Standing Committee’s Law Enforcement Inspection Power: Brief History, Process, and 
Main Functions, 11 U. PA. ASIA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (explaining what a law 
enforcement inspection entails, and providing examples). 
 40 Na Yang, Quanguo Renda Changweihui jiang Kaizhan Xingzheng Fuyi Fa Zhifa 
Jiancha (全国人大常委会将开展行政复议法执法检查)[The Standing Committee of 
National People’s Congress will Conduct the Investigative Research of the Enforcement of 
Administrative Reconsideration Law], FAZHI RIBAO (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.
npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/syxw/2013-09/03/content_1805301.htm [perma.cc/FP5X-KTD8]. 
 41 Enforcement of Administrative Reconsideration Law, supra note 30. 
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Table II: Administrative Reconsideration &Administrative 
Litigation Cases, 2008–201442 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Administrative 
Reconsideration 78,002 77,877 93,055 102,815 109,553 128,428 149,222 
Administrative 
Litigation 108,398 120,312 129,133 136,353 129,583 123,194 141,880 
 
 
Meanwhile, there is evidence that reviewing agencies have 
been more active in correcting the illegalities and irrationalities of 
administrative decisions.  For example, from January to October 
2011, the government of Shanghai Municipality struck down the 
challenged administrative decision in 32 reconsideration cases, 
accounting for 14% of the 230 cases that were handled.43  Also in 
2011, the government of Quzhou City, Zhejiang Province, struck 
down the challenged administrative decision in 31 reconsideration 
cases, accounting for 64% of the cases handled.44  In 2012, after an 
agency wrongfully refused to release certain government 
information to an individual, that person applied to the government 
of Beijing Municipality to review the non-disclosure.  The ARC of 
Beijing Municipality arranged for two part-time members to preside 
over the formal reconsideration hearing. After the hearing, these two 
part-time members patiently explained the meaning of the relevant 
articles of the Regulations on Open Government Information to the 
                                                                                                           
 42 LAW Y.B. CHINA 1000, 1026–27 (2009); LAW Y.B. CHINA 919, 945 (2010); LAW 
Y.B. CHINA 1052, 1078–79 (2011); LAW Y.B. CHINA 1066, 1090–93 (2012); LAW Y.B. 
CHINA 1210, 1236 (2013) ; LAW Y.B. CHINA 143, 1153 (2014); LAW Y.B. CHINA 1014, 
1037 (2015). 
 43 Gao, supra note 33. 
 44 Gao, supra note 33. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
124 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 13] 
agency decision-makers, eventually persuading them to correct the 
illegality.45 
IV. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE ARC MODEL 
Although the introduction of the ARC model generally has 
been well-received, as implementation has gone forward, some 
problems have come to light.  For example, there is significant 
variation between the different provinces and municipalities 
selected to carry out this experimental reform.  In some areas—
Beijing Municipality and Heilongjiang Province—the ARC model 
has been put into effect in nearly all local governments.46 But in 
many of the selected provinces and localities, the ARC model has 
only been implemented in a few pilot areas.  Meanwhile, there is 
additional variation in the status and role of ARCs in different pilot 
areas.  In some areas, ARCs are accorded a very high status, and 
charged with resolving almost all administrative reconsideration 
cases.  Elsewhere, ARCs are permitted to handle only a limited 
subset of such cases. 
In part, the caution reflected above is due to ongoing 
concerns about the sustainability of the ARC model, and its ability 
to effectively resolve administrative disputes.  If the concerns 
cannot be addressed or the ARC model is thought to be the good 
solution, the legislature will definitely not tate the ARC modle as 
breakthrough point of revisiving the ARL and the fundentmental 
system of the ARL. So the concerns will affect and decide whether  
                                                                                                           
 45 See Office of ARC of the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality, Di ErJie 
Beijing shi Renmin Zhengfu Xingzheng Fuyi Weiyuanhui Gongzuo Baogao (第二届北京
市人民政府行政复议委员会工作报告) [The Work Report of the Second ARC of the 
People’s Government of Beijing Municipality] (May 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author) (detailing the report that was persuasive in correcting the illegality). 
 46 In Beijing, ARCs have been established in the governments of all of the sixteen 
districts and counties, together with the government of Beijing Municipality. Id.In 
Heilongjiang, ARCs have existed in all twelve municipal governments, as well as the 
Government of Heilongjiang Province. Gao, supra note 33. 
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ARC model can be adopted by new ARL, they are described in the 
sections that follow.  
A. What Should Be the Status of ARCs? 
As previously mentioned, under State Council LAO’s 
reform, two versions of ARCs have been formed in the pilot areas, 
which can be characterized in terms of a “unified” (jizhong) ARC 
model and a “panel discussion” (heyi) ARC model.  Even under the 
general, overall ARC model, there are important differences 
between these two “sub-models” in terms of status and function.  
Under the unified model, ARCs may serve as the true adjudicators 
of administrative disputes and can be vested with final decision-
making authority.  On the other hand, ARCs set up according to the 
panel discussion model serve mainly to offer suggestions to the 
reviewing agency, which may well attach significant weight to those 
suggestions, but still retain final decision-making authority. 
The prevailing scholarly view is that the “unified” ARC 
model is more ideal.  After all, the process of administrative 
reconsideration can truly be independent only when the 
reconsideration committee is the actual decision-maker.  The State 
Council LAO appears to hold the same view, and to encourage local 
governments to establish ARCs in this manner.  Even then, however, 
there remains a dilemma as to how precisely to structure the 
relationship between the ARC (of a given province, municipality or 
locality) and the chief executive of that level of government.  
According to the State Council LAO’s September 2008 Notice, 
ARCs are to be established under each level of government, and 
their decisions can become effective only upon the endorsement of 
the chief executive of that level of government (e.g., the provincial 
governor).47  In theory, this arrangement could lead to difficulties, if 
                                                                                                           
 47 Notice, supra note 27. 
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there is any difference of opinion in a particular case between an 
ARC and the head of the same-level government. 
Of all the pilot areas selected to implement the ARC model, 
only the Harbin municipal government has developed a mechanism 
to address this sort of conflict, specifically one that limits the power 
of the government head to block the reconsideration committee’s 
decision. 48   Wide adoption of this “Harbin approach” may be 
unlikely, however, given resistance from local governments to the 
diminution of their control over administrative disputes.  And there 
remains the broader resistance from local government departments 
to the “unified” ARC model for the same reason. 
B. Where Should ARCs Be Located? 
A further related point that needs to be discussed is where 
ARCs should be located within the government. To address this 
question, it is useful first to analyze the nature of administrative 
reconsideration as a process of review of government action. 
In China, administrative reconsideration traditionally has 
been considered to be a form of administrative supervision: just 
another way for superior administrative agencies to monitor inferior 
administrative agencies, with no real distinction or separation from 
regular modes of administration.  Simply put, administrative 
reconsideration was thought to be “part of the machinery of 
administration.” 49   The ARL largely reflects this 
                                                                                                           
 48 Seesupra Part II (describing the pilot areas and the current mode of solving these 
conflicts). 
 49 FRANKS COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND ENQUIRIES, REPORT OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND ENQUIRIES, 1957, Cmnd. 218, at 40–
41 (U.K.), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS ON CONTEMPORARY BRITISH GOVERNMENT: I. 
BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 282 (Martin Minogue ed., 1977).The 
report concluded that the tribunal should be an adjudicative body, rather than 
administrative one, and should be fair, open and impartial. The report pointed out that 
“[t]ribunals are not ordinary courts, but neither are they appendages of Government 
Departments . . . We consider that tribunals should properly be regarded as machinery 
provided by Parliament for adjudication rather than as part of the machinery of 
administration.”Id. 
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conceptualization.50  However, this notion has been criticized by 
Chinese legal scholars, who argue that administrative 
reconsideration should be seen as“machinery for adjudication,” or at 
least a mixture of both supervision and remedy.51  With increased 
recognition of the poor performance of administrative 
reconsideration as a mechanism for resolving administrative 
disputes, this academic view has grown in popularity, and provides 
the theoretical underpinning for the State Council LAO’s 
experimental reform.52 
For many scholars, in order to draw out the nature of 
administrative reconsideration as “machinery for adjudication,” it 
would be advisable for reconsideration to be conducted by neutral, 
court-like institutions external to the administration. But State 
Council LAO’s Notice did not follow this approach. Rather, the 
Notice requires that ARCs be established under administrative 
authority—not unlike the model of administrative law judges in the 
United States.53 
                                                                                                           
 50 During the drafting process for the ARL, the former director of the State Council 
LAO, Yang Jingyu, commented that administrative reconsideration was basically 
considered to be an “oversight system within the administration, whose purpose is to self-
rectify errors[;]” hence it did not require any special and independent institution, and 
especially should not follow judicial procedures. Jingyu Yang (杨景宇 ), Guanyu 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa (Cao’an) de Shuoming(关于中华人民
共和国行政复议法(草案)的说明) [Explanation on Draft Administrative Reconsideration 
Law of People’s Republic of China], NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGRESS (Oct. 27, 1998), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/06/content_5007101.htm [perma.cc/VN2U-
EGF8]. 
 51 See, e.g., Jun Fang (方军), Lun Zhongguo Xingzheng Fuyi de Guannian Gengxin he 
Zhidu Chonggou(论中国行政复议的观念更新和制度重构) [On the Change of Ideas and 
Reconstruction of the System Concerning Administrative Reconsideration in China], 2004 
HUANQIU FALU PINGLUN 39, 39–46 (2004) (arguing that administrative reconsideration 
should be an important administrative remedy system with a dual nature: administrative 
and judicial). 
 52 The Notice clearly states that “administrative reconsideration is an important 
statutory channel of resolving administrative disputes, protecting lawful rights and interests 
of citizens, pushing administrative agencies observing law, and doing the social 
justice.”Notice, supra note 27 (author translation). 
 53 By contrast, Australia forbids the creation of multi-functional agencies that perform 
both judicial and non-judicial functions. Likewise, in the UK, adjudicatory functions are 
performed either by courts or free-standing tribunals.See Peter Cane, Understanding 
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The problem, then, is how to separate the adjudicative 
functions of ARCs from regular authority and processes within the 
administration.  There are two main possibilities.  First, ARCscould 
be established under the direct leadership of the chief executive of 
that level of government, and otherwise made completely 
independent of other government departments.  In this scenario, 
ARCs would enjoy their own working offices, separate from other 
government departments. Alternatively, ARCs could be established 
under the chief executive’s direct leadership, but would have their 
working offices situated within that level of government’s 
legislative affairs office (fazhiban). This second approach is the 
prevailing practice in the pilot areas, and, from the perspective of 
country-wide fazhiban, the more realistic one.  However, in my own 
view, given that fazhiban mostly serves to draft rules and review the 
rulemaking of other government departments, the first approach is 
superior. 
C. Who Should Be the Full-time and Part-time Members of ARCs? 
Needless to say, the identity and qualifications of both full-
time and part-time members of ARCs is an important issue that will 
greatly influence both the status of ARCs and the quality of the 
reconsideration that they offer.  According to the State Council 
LAO’s Notice, scholars and other experts from outside the 
administration should be invited to become part-time members of 
ARCs, working alongside the full-time members.54  However, the 
Notice does not clarify what proportion of committee members 
should be “part-time.”  Also, the Notice does not address the 
qualifications of full-time members. 
                                                                                                           
Administrative Adjudication, in ADMINISTRATION LAW IN A CHANGING STATE: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF MARK ARONSON 273, 282 (Linda Pearson et al. eds., 2008) (juxtaposing the 
differences in several countries’ separation of judicial and non-judicial functions). 
 54 The Notice encourages the pilot places to “make full use of the role played by the 
scholars, experts and other social resources.”See Notice, supra note 27 (author translation) 
(encouraging collaboration and all who can help to work together). 
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On the first issue, some scholars argue that part-time 
members should account for well over half of all committee 
members, because this would help to mitigate interference from the 
administration and better safeguard the independence of the 
reconsideration process.55This is a compelling argument. However, 
it may be difficult for county-level governments,56 particularly in 
rural areas, to make such provisions. If this rule were to be adopted, 
it would be important to permit some exceptions, at least for a given 
period. 
According to preliminary statistics compiled by the State 
Council LAO, there were a total of only 1,532 full-time ARC 
members throughout the country by the end of 2011.57   This 
suggests that, to a large extent, civil servants must be handling 
administrative reconsideration cases alongside other duties.  As to 
the qualifications of the full-time committee members, the 
Regulation on Implementation of the Administrative 
Reconsideration Law, issued by the State Council in 2007, provides 
that “specialized personnel for administrative reconsideration 
should possess the qualities, expertise and capabilities that are 
appropriate for performing their responsibilities for administrative 
reconsideration, and shall have obtained relevant qualifications.”58  
The regulation further stipulates that more “specific rules shall be 
                                                                                                           
 55 See, e.g., Xin Liu (刘莘), Xingzheng Fuyi de Dingwei Zhizheng(行政复议的定位
之争) [On the Discussion of Position of Administrative Reconsideration], 26 FAXUE 
LUNTAN 10, 11–5 (2011) (discussing the independence of the reconsideration process as an 
outstanding issue). 
 56 In China, there are four main levels of sub-national government: provincial, 
municipal, county, and township. According to the ARL, township-level governments may 
not serve as reviewing agencies for the purposes of administrative reconsideration.See 
ARL, supra note 4, art. 12-15 (prescribing the determination of reviewing agencies for 
administrative reconsideration).  
 57 See Yang &Cai, supra note 32 (detailing the total full-time ARC members and 
putting that number in perspective as being extremely low). 
 58 See Xingzheng Fuyi Fa Shishi Tiaoli (行政复议法实施条例) [Regulation on 
Implementation of the Administrative Reconsideration Law] (promulgated by the State 
Council, May 23, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2007) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S 
CONG. GAZ. 20, art. 4 (promoting scholarship and the gaining of other necessary skills to 
benefit the administrative reconsideration process). 
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made by the legislative affairs department of the State Council in 
conjunction with other relevant authorities of the State Council.”59  
To date, no such rules have been issued.  Consequently, ordinary 
civil servants without legal qualifications can become full-time 
members of reconsideration committees—which would seem to 
undercut the main purpose of the ARC model, to improve the 
quality of reconsideration decisions. 
D. How Does the New Arrangement that Reviewing Agency Should 
Basically Serve as the Defendant in Administrative Litigation 
Influence ARCs? 
In Chinese administrative law, administrative litigation is the 
formal remedy of last resort, by which I mean that citizens who are 
dissatisfied with administrative reconsideration decisions usually 
retain the right to pursue administrative litigation next.  In those 
circumstances, there would be two administrative agencies involved 
in the case: both the original agency decision-maker and the 
reviewing agency.  Determining which agency should then serve as 
the defendant in the administrative lawsuit is an important and 
difficult issue. 
The original ALL took a complex position, where 
determination of the defendant depended on the nature of the 
reviewing agency’s decision.  There are three potential types of 
decision by the reviewing agency in a reconsideration case: 
confirmation, modification (including reversal and alteration), and 
omission (i.e., refusal to accept the case, or no decision).  In the first 
circumstance, where the reviewing agency has re-affirmed the 
challenged agency decision, the original ALL stipulated that the 
defendant and the primary target of judicial review should be the 
original agency decision-maker. 60   In the second circumstance, 
                                                                                                           
 59 Id. 
 60 See ALL, supra note 3, art. 25(“Regarding a reconsidered case, if the 
reconsideration organization upholds the original specific administrative act, the 
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where the challenged agency decision has been modified in the 
administrative reconsideration process, the original ALL stipulated 
that the defendant in subsequent litigation should be the reviewing 
agency, its reconsideration decision becoming the focus of judicial 
review.61  In the third circumstance, where the reviewing agency has 
either refused to accept the case or made no reconsideration 
decision, determination of the defendant was left to the plaintiff’s 
discretion, and the suit could be filed against the original agency 
decision-maker or against the reviewing agency for its failure to 
act.62 
The key purpose underlying this complicated arrangement 
was to maintain a balanced administrative law caseload among the 
different levels of the Chinese judicial system.  However, this 
arrangement caused an unexpected and troubling result: reviewing 
agencies tended just to confirm the original agency’s decision in 
order to avoid becoming the target of an administrative lawsuit.63  In 
China, there are many factors that make agencies want to avoid 
becoming a defendant in a lawsuit.  Among these are entrenched 
cultural norms, and the continuing aversion of Chinese people to 
litigation.64  Although this sentiment is growing weaker over time, it 
                                                                                                           
administrative organ that initially took the act shall be the defendant; if the reconsideration 
organization has changed the original specific administrative act, the reconsideration 
organization shall be the defendant.”). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Zhixing Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Xingzheng Susong Fa Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi(最高人民法院关于执行中华人民共和国
行政诉讼法若干问题的解释) [The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court of 
Several Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Judicial Comm. of the Supreme People’s 
Court, Nov. 24, 1999, effective Mar. 10, 2000) 2000STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S 
CONG. GAZ. 3, art. 22 (describing the third circumstance). 
 63 See Fuyi Jiguan Gaibugai Zuoshang Beigaoxi(复议机关该不该坐上被告席) 
[Should the Reviewing Agency Be the Defendant?], LEGAL DAILY, (July 4, 2010), 
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xzfy/llyj/201007/20100700257526.shtml 
[perma.cc/XJB3-TSQE] (reporting reviewing agencies’ choices to avoid becoming the 
defendant in administrative litigation by confirming the original decision, and stating that 
330 cases of 360 administrative reconsideration cases supported the original decisions). 
 64 See He Qinhua (何勤华 ), Fansong yu Yansong de Lishi Kaocha—Guanyu 
Zhongxifang Falü Chuantong de Yidian Sikao(泛讼与厌讼的历史考察——关于中西方
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is still prevalent.  Of course, the unwillingness of reviewing 
agencies to risk becoming a defendant themselves may have been 
based on many practical considerations as well.  For example, 
preparing to defend against a lawsuit consumes an agency’s time 
and energy, and if the agency were to lose the case, it would bear 
heavy costs. 
Under the new ARC model, these problems were further 
exacerbated.  For example, in the circumstance where an ARC is the 
actual adjudicator, but the decision is still credited to a reviewing 
agency, the reviewing agency would be even more reluctant to play 
the role of defendant in an administrative lawsuit.  Many scholars 
came to argue that the original agency decision-maker should 
continue to be the defendant in administrative litigation subsequent 
to administrative reconsideration, no matter what decision was made 
by the reviewing agency in the interim.65   But other scholars 
objected to this argument, and recommended maintaining the status 
quo,66 or even making the reviewing agency always serve as the 
                                                                                                           
法律传统的一点思考)[Historical Study on Pro-litigation and Anti-litigation—Thoughts 
on Legal Tradition between China and the Western Countries], 3 FALÜKEXUE1, 15 (1993) 
(arguing that because of various factors, anti-litigation has prevailed in China since ancient 
times). 
 65 For many scholars, under the new system of administrative reconsideration 
committee, the ARC is a neutral adjudicator, not simply the administrative decision-maker. 
Therefore, the decision made by the ARC is not an administrative act, but a quasi-judicial 
decision. The original agency decision-maker should be the defendant. See Qing Feng& 
Zhang Shuihai, Xingzheng Fuyi Jiguan Zai Xingzheng Susong Zhong Zuo Beigao Wenti de 
Fansi(行政复议机关在行政诉讼中作被告问题的反思)[Reflection on the Administrative 
Reconsideration Agency Being a Defendant in the Administrative Litigation], 1 
XINGZHENGFAXUEYANGJIU1, 11–14 (2013) (stating that, with the reform of administrative 
reconsideration system and judicialization of administrative reconsideration, reviewing 
agencies should not continue to be defendants). 
 66 See Zhao Yuan, Jianxi Xingzheng Fuyi Jiguan de Beigao Diwei Wenti(简析行政复
议机关的被告地位问题)[On the Administrative Reconsideration Agency as Defendant], 4 
HEBEI FAXUE155, 156 (2009) (arguing that no matter what the consequence of 
reconsideration is, an arrangement in which the original agency or reviewing agency is a 
defendant has many drawbacks and it is better to maintain the present arrangement with 
some adjustments). 
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defendant in administrative litigation (no matter what decision was 
reached in administrative reconsideration).67 
After hot debates, the amended ALL ultimately seems to 
support the latter. The amended ALL dramatically changes the rule 
of determination of the defendant subsequent to administrative 
reconsideration. 68 As to three types of administrative 
reconsiderationdecision mentioned above(confirmation, 
modification and omission), the amended ALL maintainsthe old 
arrangement of the determination of defendant for modification and 
omission decisions, but completely changes the determination of 
defendant for confirmation decisions; in this circumstance, 
according to the amended ALL, the reviewing agency and the 
original agency decision-maker should be the co-defendants in 
administrative litigation subsequent to administrative 
reconsideration. 69  This means that the reviewing agency will 
basically be the defendant in mostsubsequent administrative 
litigation.  Until this arrangement, reviewing agencies are 
experiencing the pressure of huge number of administrative 
litigation cases. In 2015, Courts at all levels heard 241,000 
                                                                                                           
 67 Supporters of this view believe that this arrangement will strengthen the 
responsibility for the reviewing agency. Should the Reviewing Agency Be the 
Defendant?,supra note 63. 
68 ALL, supra note 3, art. 26. As for these changes and the relevant comments, see 
Liang Fengyun(梁凤云), Xingzheng Fuyi Jiguan Zuowei Gongtong Beigao Wenti Yanju: 
Jiyu Lifa he Shifa de Kaoliang (行政复议机关作共同被告问题研究——基于立法和司
法的考量)[Research on Issues about Administrative Reconsideration Agency as Co-
defendants: Based on both Legislative and Judicial Reconsiderations]，6 ZHENGFA 
LUNTAN （政法论坛）[RIBUNE OF PLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW], 122-135, (2016) 
( analyzing the reasons of the change and supporting the change.) Shen Fujun(沈福俊), 
Fuyi Jiguan Gongtong Beigao Zhidu zhi Jianshi(复议机关共同被告制度之检
视)[Analysis on System of  Reconsideration Agency as Co-defendants] 6 FAXUE (法学) 
[LAW SCIENCE], 108-118, (2016)  (analyzing the practical influences of  the change and 
criticizing the change.) 
 69 Article 26 of the amended ALL provides “Regarding a reconsidered case, if the 
reconsideration organization upholds the original administrative act, the administrative 
organ that initially took the act  and the reconsideration organization shall be the co-
defendants; if the reconsideration organization has changed the original administrative act, 
the reconsideration organization shall be the defendant.” Amended ALL, supra note 3, art. 
26.. 
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administrative litigation cases of first instance and concluded 
199,000 cases, up by 59.2% and 51.8% respectively over 201470. 
The cases of reviewing agencies as the defendants account for a 
large proportion. So, the reviewing agencies have to spend more 
time in dealing with the administrative litigation. The following 
sentence gives the vivid description of workload:  “The reviewing 
agency is either in the courtroom for answering the administrative 
litigation case or on the way to the court in order to prepare for 
answering the administrative litigation case ” 71 . As a result, 
reviewing agencies have not enough time and energy to hear the 
administrative reconsideration cases. Ever if they hear, they may 
tend to diminish the role of ARCs in order to strengthen the control 
the administrative reconsideration or to save the time. 
 
V. THE FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSIDERATION IN 
CHINA 
In early 2010, the State Council decided to list revision of 
the Administrative Reconsideration Law on its legislative agenda, 
and instructed its Legislative Affairs Office to prepare draft 
amendments. 72   Subsequently, the State Council LAO 
                                                                                                           
70 See Zhou Qiang(周强), President of the Supreme People's Court（最高人民法院院长） 
，Report on the Work of the Supreme People's Court, delivered  at the Fourth Session of 
the Twelfth National People's Congress (最高人民法院工作报告——2016年 3月 13日
在第十二届全国人民代表大会第四次会议上) (March 13, 2016), 
http://www.chinahumanrights.org/html/2016/MAGAZINES_0919/5652.html. 
71 See Shen Fujun(沈福俊), Fuyi Jiguan Gongtong Beigao Zhidu zhi Jianshi(复议机关共
同被告制度之检视)[Analysis on System of  Reconsideration Agency as Co-defendants] 6 
FAXUE (法学) [LAW SCIENCE], 108-118, (2016) 
72The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the State Council, the 
Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate, and the special committees of the National People’s Congress may submit to 
the National People’s Congress legislative bills, which shall be put on the agenda of a 
session by decision of the Presidium. Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation] (promulgated 
by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective Jul. 1, 2000), 2000 STANDING COMM. 
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 2,art. 12. The State Council, the Central Military Commission, 
the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate or a special committee of 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/6
[2018] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 135 
commissioned a group of administrative law scholars to provide 
“experts’ draft amendments” within one year.  The ARC model 
served as the basis for the proposed draft amendments that 
eventually came out of that expert group’s deliberative process.73 
After several years of waiting, the Report on the Work of the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPC”), 
delivered by Chairman Zhang Dejiang of the NPC Standing 
Committee on March 9, 2014 for review at the Second Session of 
the 12th NPC and adopted on March 13, 2014, clearly said that 
revision of the Administrative Reconsideration Law will be the 
2014 agenda of the NPC Standing Committee.74  Thereafter, the 
revision of the Administrative Reconsideration Law was listed in 
the legislative plan of 2014 of the NPC Standing Committee.  
According to the plan, the NPC Standing Committee will finish the 
first reading the draft amendment of the Administrative 
Reconsideration Law. 75  This indicates that the NPC Standing 
                                                                                                           
the National People’s Congress may submit a legislative bill to the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress. Id. at art. 24. Consequently, the State Council has the 
power to put forward the legislative bill about amendments to the ARL to the National 
People’s Congress and its Standing Committee.Id. 
73The author, as a member of this expert group, participated in the group’s deliberations 
and drafting process. The draft that was submitted to the LAO at the end of 2011 aims to 
make administrative reconsideration the primary forum for resolving administrative 
disputes in China by improving its independence, openness and fairness. Besides 
supporting further development of the ARC system, other key elements of the experts’ 
proposed amendments include: (1) enlarging the scope of administrative reconsideration 
cases to include all administrative decisions except those excluded by express statutory 
provisions; (2) establishing a “public function test” to include decisions made by non-
governmental bodies exercising public functions; and (3) generally judicializing 
administrative reconsideration procedures. 
 74 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Gongzuo Baogao (全国人
民代表大会常务委员会工作报告)[The Report on the Work of the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress] (Mar. 9, 2014), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/dbdhhy/12_2/2014-03/17/content_1856100_4.htm. 
 75 See Xuewen Zhang, Wei Quanmian Shenhua Gaige Tigong Qiangyouli de Fazhi 
Baozhang: Quanguo Renda Changweihui Chutai 2014 NianLifaGongzuoJihua (为全面深
化改革提供强有力的法制保障: 全国人大常委会出台 2014 年立法工作计划) 
[Providing Powerful Legal Guarantees for Comprehensively Deepening Reform: 
Legislative Plan of 2014 of the NPC Standing Committee], 8 ZHONGGUO RENDA [NAT’L 
PEOPLE’S CONGRESS] (2014), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zgrdzz/2014-
05/14/content_1862889.htm. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
136 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 13] 
Committee has begun the revision of the ARL. However, the 
progress was not smooth. The NPC Standing Committee didn’t 
begin the first reading because  it didn’t receive the Administrative 
Reconsideration Law bill. In 2015 and 2016, the thing remained so. 
As of this writing, it is difficult to predict when the revision of 
Administrative Reconsideration Law will  be the real agenda of the 
NPC Standing Committee and to predict the outcome of ACRs. 
The reason behind it is that it is hard to reach a consensus 
about how to revise the administrative reconsideration system. 
Because the administrative reconsideration committee system may 
diminish administrative power in some circumstances and has some 
above-mentioned concerns, it may not be the best choice. But it 
seems to have not formed the best alternative until now. Any 
legislative process requires complex bargaining between parties 
representing different interests, and revision of the Administrative 
Reconsideration Law will be no exception. The crucial step of 
revision of the Administrative Reconsideration Law is to find an 
equilibrium point between the different interests. 
       Undoubtedly, the ARC model still is an important choice. We 
should give an overall assessment of trial experimentation with 
ARCs and fully analyze the advantages and disadvantages of this 
new model, and then decide the fate of ARCs and development 
direction of the administrative reconsideration system.  
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